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corporate fines, and drug taxes. Doctrinally, deciding whether a statute is civil or criminal is a threshold question to determining whether a defendant is entitled to claims under the ex post facto and Bill of Attainder clauses, as well as the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. 9 The question these cases have forced the court to consider is: when is the state imposing a civil sanction rather than criminal punishment? The answer the court is committed to is, roughly: a statute imposes punishment if the legislature was motivated by a desire to punish the conduct targeted by it. Legislative intent can be overturned, but only if the petitioner can show, by the clearest proof, that the characteristics and effects of the challenged legislation are so facially punitive that the legislature's stated intent is not credible. 10 This has since come to be known as the "intent-effects" test.
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The intent-effects test reflects an underlying conception of punishment and, corresponding to that conception of punishment, a distinctive view about the limits of the criminal law. While legal theorists, like the court itself, have focused on the allegedly intention-sensitive character of 9 See, e. 10 "If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [Congress's] intention to deem it 'civil.'" Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92. 11 The test was first formally articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) . punishment, I propose to examine the largely unexamined view that the limits of the criminal law are to be drawn with reference to the concept of punishment. In particular, I shall explore the possibility that what should matter for purposes of allocating constitutional rights is not whether the state is or is not punishing someone, but rather the severity of what the state is proposing to do, as measured by impact on certain types of fundamental interests. The motivation for this line of thought rests on my claim that the intent-effects test in fact depends on a highly controversial position in moral theory, namely, the view that an agent's intentions bear directly on what it is permissible for that agent to do.
In the first part of the paper, I argue that drawing the boundaries of the criminal law by reference to an intention-sensitive conception of punishment rests on the doctrine of double effect. Legal theorists who are skeptical of double effect reasoning owe us, I claim, an alternative account of the distinctiveness of the criminal law. I go on in the remaining sections to sketch the broad outlines of just such an alternative account-one that focuses on the objective impact of legislation on a class of protected interests, regardless of the state's motivations in enacting the legislation and, therefore, regardless of whether the state's actions qualify as punishment.
12 I conclude by suggesting how such a view might apply to cases like Doe and Hendricks, and conclude by noting some of its ramifications.
1.
The search for a "definition" of anything as complex and contested as punishment is likely to seem a piece of pointless conceptualism. But it is not. Both the Constitution and the common 12 I note that I do not distinguish here between intention and motive. I use these terms interchangeably to refer to an agent's reasons for acting.
law distinguish the law of crimes from all other areas of law, reserving special procedural and substantive rights to those haled into court on criminal charges. It is therefore important to know when a case is "criminal" and when it is not. For instance, if what the criminal law is about is the administration of punishment, then we need to know whether, in cases where rights reserved for criminal defendants are being asserted, what the state is doing counts as punishment. Of course, in the vast majority of cases it is perfectly clear whether the state is or is not proceeding criminally. But the reason it is typically so clear is that in most cases the consequences the state is seeking to impose-imprisonment, probation, community service, fines-are broadly and unequivocally understood to be punitive, and hence indisputably within the scope of the criminal law. But in cases where it is not so clear-such as preventive detention, asset forfeiture, community notification, and so forth-settling on a definition of punishment becomes a matter of intensely practical significance.
Among legal theorists, a persistent theme has been that the concept of punishment must incorporate a reference to the state of mind of the person imposing the punishment. For instance, David Boonin has recently argued that punishment must be an intentional, rather than incidental, infliction of suffering. 13 This does not mean that punishment is sadistic, that the suffering is intended for its own sake. It may be intended as a means to a non-punitive end such as rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution. But for it to be punishment, rather than something else, the suffering has to be inflicted, as we say, "on purpose." Boonin's argument for this claim is that unless the suffering is intended, then all sorts of state action that is in some sense harmful- building an airport in an established neighborhood, forcing people to pay fees for marriage licenses, civil commitment of the insane, and so forth-will implausibly have to be deemed "punishment." Distinguishing punishment from mere harming on the basis of the punisher's intention to inflict the harm will draw a more intuitively plausible line-distinguishing, as
Holmes famously quipped, between being kicked and being tripped over.
14 Drawing the line between punishment and non-punishment might, however, require more than simply ascertaining whether someone was made to suffer deliberately. The particular reason the person was made to suffer might matter as well. A coach might push an athlete to the point of exhaustion, on the theory that the suffering she experiences will contribute to making her a better athlete. It would be awkward to conclude that the coach is punishing the athlete, at least absent any reference to a belief on her part that the athlete had committed some infraction making her deserving of the harsh treatment. John Gardner defends a view along these lines in his illuminating introduction to the new edition of Hart's Punishment and Responsibility. 15 Gardner claims that characterizing an act as punishment implies that the agent acts, at least in part, on the basis of (what she at least perceives to be) a wrong committed by the person who she seeks to punish. As Gardner writes: "there are many possible reasons for punishing people, but the fact that a wrong was (supposedly or actually) committed is the only reason for punishing people of 14 Boonin describes the intentionality of punishment as "almost universally accepted in the literature on punishment." Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, pp.13-14, n.14. As Gardner makes clear, subscribing to principle R does not entail that criminal sanctions must be defended from an exclusively or even predominantly retributivist point of view. All it entails is that for a defense of the use of those kinds of sanctions to count as a defense of statesanctioned punishment, it must acknowledge at least some role for the belief that a wrong committed by the relevant person counts as a reason for applying the sanctions. It may not be much of a reason: as Gardner rightly points out, it may well be that a principle R-conforming reason is too modest on its own to justify any of our accustomed punitive practices, so a full blown defense of those practices might place significant, even overwhelming, weight on the prospective social benefits of such a practice. The claim is only that for a deterrencerehabilitation-incapacitation based regime to also count as a punitive one, the motivations of the relevant institutions and officials must be as principle R describes. 17 In this respect, principle R does not attempt to define non-retributive theories of punishment out of existence. engaged in the practice of punishment unless she counted the wrongfulness of B's actions as adding something to the justification of her attempt to make him suffer.
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Principle R provides a vindication of the Supreme Court's consistent emphasis on state motivation when it is called upon to decide if some burden is a civil penalty or a criminal punishment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted, in dozens of cases spanning the better part of a century and across multiple legal and factual contexts, that whether a statute is civil or criminal depends on whether it imposes punishment or not, and that whether a statute imposes punishment depends on whether it was motivated in a primarily retributive spirit. 20 Typically, in these cases if the state can mount a remotely plausible claim that its aims are predominantly "regulatory" rather than "punitive," the courts will construe the statute as civil, and hence as not giving rise to criminal rights under the ex post facto, double jeopardy, Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth Amendments, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, government-funded lawyers, and so forth. Principle R helps explain why the doctrine should have this shape: the criminal law 19 The force of principle R can be clarified by an example. Suppose that you are told that by pressing this button, you will cause some people to experience pleasure and others to experience pain, but that on balance the pleasure will outweigh the pain. By principle R's lights, in choosing whether to press the button, you are not choosing between punishing and not punishing. If, however, you come to believe that the people who will experience the pain are those who have committed some wrongful act, and you believe that this carries at least some weight in favor of pushing the button-it is not completely neutral, like the fact that they all have blinked eight times in the last two minutes-then your decision becomes, under principle R, a decision about whether or not to punish. This remains the case under Gardner's ecumenical approach even if you ultimately decide that you will push the button only if doing so is likely to make people less likely to engage in wrongful acts in the future. 20 At one point in time, the Supreme Court took, albeit briefly, a somewhat more expansive view. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (stating that whether a penalty constitutes punishment depends on whether it "cannot be fairly said to solely serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.") I note that despite criticism of the outcomes in cases like Hendricks, legal theorists have tended to agree with the structure of the Supreme Court's reasoning. See, e.g., Husak, "Lifting the Cloak," at p.1181 (posing the question, "how do we know whether a law enacted by the state qualifies as one of its criminal laws?," and answering it with the claim that "the criminal law just is that body of law that subjects person to state punishment. If punishment is the sanction the state is authorized to inflict for violations of a rule, it follows that that rule is part of its criminal law. This point can be brought out more fully by bearing in mind that the role of the civilcriminal distinction in these cases is to allocate different types of rights among litigants. As I noted earlier, these are rights such as the right against being prosecuted twice for the same offense, the right to state-funded counsel, and so forth. The impact of these "procedural" rights is not always to prohibit the state from achieving certain outcomes, but it is to prohibit the state from achieving those outcomes in particular ways. Perhaps there is nothing per se wrong with putting someone into preventive detention, but there might nonetheless be something wrong with doing so without certain types of evidence or procedural safeguards. Similarly, while criminalizing X may be within the legislature's power, the rights reserved for "criminal" To be sure, even if intentions do not matter to permissibility in a direct manner, they may matter in a more indirect manner; and they may also be significant along other axes of moral assessment. For instance, a person may perform a permissible act out of despicable motives, and this would surely color our reaction to him, even if it does not affect the permissibility of the act.
Analogously, a punitively motivated rule might have a different symbolic valence than it would
were it motivated by a concern for public safety. A member of the political community might reasonably feel that justifying a controversial measure on punitive grounds would cast an unflattering light on the community; perhaps the institutions enforcing the rule would come to be seen as to that degree reactive and vengeful. The political symbolism and social meaning of a law might well depend on the state's advertised reasons for adopting it, and these reasons may make the difference in determining whether the sanctions that the law authorizes are or are not punishment. But whether or not a law imposes punishment could only bear on the question of whether it is permissibly enforced without providing the rights and restrictions of criminal process through an application of double effect reasoning.
Proponents of IIP need not insist that the agent's intent never bears on permissibility, only that it does not bear on permissibility in a direct way. This leaves open the possibility that it might bear on permissibility indirectly. For instance, Scanlon has suggested that a pilot's intentions in bombing a legitimate military target-to destroy the enemy's wartime capacity, or to terrorize civilians-might be indirectly relevant to whether it is permissible for him to proceed, insofar as a pilot bent on terrorizing civilians is predictably more likely to carry out the sortie in a way that results in a larger number of civilian deaths than a pilot who acts with the intention simply of setting back the enemy's war-making capacity. 26 So in this way the pilot's intention would bear on permissibility, although not of its own accord but rather because of what Scanlon refers to as its "predictive" value vis-à-vis the sortie's expected consequences.
Is it analogously conceivable that a state that is set on inflicting harm on individuals for perceived wrongs is more likely to act excessively than a state that is seeking to (for instance) enforce safety or health standards? If so, then perhaps state motive might matter to permissibility in this indirect way. However, even if a punitive motivation is predictive of excessively harsh outcomes, it is not clear that judicial analysis of state motive would be the appropriate response.
For, unlike the bomber pilot, where it is difficult to control for unwanted outcomes once permission is given and the pilot is in the air, in the context of state decision-making, courts review allegedly excessive outcomes directly, by entertaining facial and as-applied challenges to such legislation. So there is little need to rely on state intent as an ex ante predictor, when what it is supposed to be predictive of-rights-infringing legislation-can be reviewed directly to confirm consistency with protected rights. 27 Perhaps sanction-imposing laws are more akin to what Scanlon calls "incentive threats," such as "your money or your life." As Scanlon points out, the permissibility of at least some incentive threats appears to rest on the intention of the person making the threat. For instance, an employer may be permitted to threaten to fire an employee if she does not increase her sales figures, but not if she does not sleep with him. Firing the employee, while generally within the discretion of the employer, would not be an available option if motivated in that way. Scanlon's explanation for these cases-which I find quite plausible-is that they turn on the "claims of those who are victims of threats to be free from certain forms of control," rather than the "illegitimacy of the agent's reasons." Moral Dimensions, p.87. Of course, courts could (and in rare occasions, do) ask whether the state should be in the business of making Suppose that whether the state intends to punish or merely to "regulate" does not bear on the permissibility of a proposed course of (state) action. In that case, the appeal to state intention to determine which rights the state is constitutionally required to observe would be quite mysterious. It might, however, be objected that the focus on state intent has nothing to do with double effect reasoning, but is motivated rather by a concern with the stigmatic harms of a criminal conviction. The symbolic meaning of a statute is significantly driven by public understanding of whether or not that statute is intended to punish those to whom it applies; and perhaps, the objection might continue, robust constitutional protections in the criminal law are meant to protect those facing the prospect of such heavy stigmatic burdens. So, one might conclude, there is a reason to insist on proof of punitive intent prior to allocating constitutional criminal rights that is independent of double effect reasoning.
I have no quarrel with the empirical part of this claim; as I noted earlier, it is indeed plausible that public perception of a statute as punitive may color public reaction, both formally (e.g., by employers) and informally (by family, friends, and acquaintances), to a conviction under that statute. However, this objection fails to connect for two basic reasons. First, it fails as an explanation of why, in principle, a court might want to focus on state intent rather than look to the creation of stigma itself. Second, it is flatly inconsistent with what the Supreme Court has actually said about its interest in state intent.
First, while the concern with stigma might explain why legal doctrine should be responsive to sources of stigmatic harm, that concern does not explain why legal doctrine should take the indirect option of regulating stigma by regulating one of the means of generating it, rather than incentive threats targeting various types of conduct, or whether doing so inappropriately invades a sphere of private autonomy. In contrast, however, the question the civil-criminal distinction raises is not whether the state may make the threat at all, but whether it may make it unaccompanied by the rights and restrictions of criminal process.
regulating it directly-particularly when indirect regulation of this form is known to be significantly under-inclusive. Suppose, that is, that we want to ensure that people who are likely to be severely stigmatized have the benefit of enhanced procedural protections; why, then, should we restrict those protections to cases in which the stigma was created by a criminal conviction, and exclude cases in which, perhaps equally severe, stigma results outside traditional criminal process? Consider again community notification requirements for former sex offenders.
It would be quite implausible to claim that whether a person who is forced to broadcast his status as a former sex offender to his friends and neighbors is stigmatized depends on the motives a court attributes to the state legislature. Yet in this case, the intent-effects test only grants procedural protections to those who can prove a punitive state motive-a result that is perverse under the proposed explanation for the Court's concern with state intent. As this example illustrates, if the underlying concern is to protect individuals from severe stigmatization, then using state intent as a form of proxy regulation is worse than otiose; it is downright counterproductive.
It is also not plausible to suggest that courts are unable to regulate stigma-creating legislation directly, and must for some reason resort to indirect regulation of state intent. For instance, in a case concerning a provincial government's attempt to retain custody over a mother's children, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the "stigma and distress" of having one's children removed from one's custody were sufficient to engage s.7's security of the person interest. 28 There was no hint of a need to inquire into the state's purposes in removing the child, whether it was to impose "punishment" or to promote the best interests of the child. Similarly, in the Internet. 31 Nevertheless, the Court turned aside the petitioner's argument on the grounds that the stigma of the registry was not "an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme,"
and that the "purpose and principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender." 32 Alaska's intention was to provide a non-punitive "civil regulation," and the fact that in doing so it severely stigmatized registrants did not support a ban on its retroactive application. 33 At the same time, Justice Thomas also acknowledged that, had Alaska's legislature been motivated by a punitive intention, then the registry would have fallen clearly on the "criminal" side of the line, and been subject to the ex post facto ban, regardless of whether it created stigmatic harm. 34 In short, Justice Thomas (a) explicitly conceded that Alaska's registration scheme imposes severe stigmatic burdens, but held that (b) it was not within the scope of the ex post facto clause because it was not punitively motivated, while acknowledging (c) that if it were punitively motivated, it would fall within the scope of the clause regardless of whether it was stigmatizing. A clearer and more thoroughgoing rejection of the claim that the intent-effects test is meant as proxy regulation of stigmatic harm is hard to imagine.
To sum up: not only does the attempt to explain the focus on legislative intent in terms of stigma fail to explain what it purports to explain, it is plainly inconsistent with how the Supreme Court has actually interpreted and applied the intent-effects test. As careful attention to the actual structure of Supreme Court doctrine reveals, punitive intent matters directly to the allocation of constitutional rights, not as an indirect proxy for stigma. 31 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 99. 32 Id.
33 Id. at 105-06. 34 Id. at 92 ("If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.") Finally, one might perhaps argue that the Supreme Court's various pronouncements about the importance of punitive purpose in its civil-criminal analysis shouldn't be taken to reveal anything about the criminal, versus civil, law. Perhaps these pronouncements merely serve to express a more general principle of judicial deference to legislative decision-making.
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The argument is too glib by half. Were the real concern one of pure deference to the legislature, it would be far easier for the Supreme Court to foreclose all such litigation by announcing that the relevant legal standard is: how did the legislature label the statute?
Controversies under this sort of test would be hard to imagine, and deference to legislative rights-allocation would be complete. But no justice has ever gone quite that far. Although the label applied to the statute is usually cited in support of its putatively "civil" character, it is not dispositive. And the reason for this is clear. What matters is whether the legislature was motivated by a punitive purpose, not whether it intended to call the statute "criminal."
The same goes for the thought that the intent-effects test, whatever other faults it may suffer from, at least makes it easy for courts and litigants to know whether any particular statute is or is not punitive. Predictability and ease of administration are, of course, serious concerns which institutions and legal rules are rightly attentive to. However, they fail to explain the intent-effects test, for it would be far easier for the Supreme Court to defer to legislative labeling rather than get involved in the search for inevitably elusive state intent. This would be far easier to administer, as there are far fewer questions about how a legislature has labeled a statute than 35 It is worth pausing here to clarify a methodological point. It is entirely possible that the proper attitude to Supreme Court doctrine is to disregard the merits of what is actually said and to instead speculate about personal or institutional motives for saying it. That is, evidently, not the attitude I adopt here. My approach takes the Court's doctrinal pronouncements at face value, and traces out their logical presuppositions, in this case to a well-recognized position in moral theory. As such, the possibility that none of the justices were personally moved to support the intent-effects test on account of a belief in double effect reasoning is neither here nor there. 40 Suppose, for instance, that a legal rule classifies water as potable once it has been heated to 85F. Such a rule would appear to reflect the view that heating water to 85F is sufficient to kill dangerous parasites. But to say this much is of course not to say that the judges who apply the rule are themselves committed to the view that heating water to 85F renders water safe to drink. It is, however, to say that insofar as the legal rule is meant to ensure that water meeting the standard it sets is safe to drink, i.e., potable, it depends upon-and in that sense is committed to-the truth of the implied proposition. Analogously, a constitutional rule that classifies legal rules on the basis of the underlying state intent depends on the soundness of double effect reasoning because it makes what the state may permissibly do depend, in part, on whether the state intends the harm it inflicts or whether it is merely the foreseen side-effect of some other aim. Now, one conceivable response would be to reject the civil-criminal distinction as entirely illusory or pointless. But this might seem too breezily dismissive. After all, the distinction between civil and criminal law is deeply entrenched, of long historical pedigree, and is common to most, and perhaps all, Western legal systems. 42 It would thus be surprising to learn that nothing can be said in favor of the distinction, or at least something more or less closely resembling it. Whatever philosophical scruples the current status quo view might raise, at least it has an account of the distinction's significance. I shall, therefore, pursue a different strategy.
As a description of everyday usage, I suppose it must be right to say that the sentence, "A punishes B," if true, entails that A has a particular attitude or characteristic set of attitudes toward B. So I shall concede that punishment, at least as we are accustomed to conceiving of it, must to that extent be a retributive practice-that is, a practice structured by principle R. 43 What I suggest we find less obvious is the proposition that the criminal law is essentially about punishment; that it is, in other words, essentially an institution for the imposition of punishment.
Perhaps what is distinctive about the criminal law is not the punitive character of its sanctions, but the severity of its sanctions. From this point of view, the point of distinguishing between civil and criminal law is not to distinguish between those state actions that express punitive purpose and those that don't. It is to distinguish between those that are seriously invasive of basic individual interests and those that are not. On this view, the allocation of special rights to criminal defendants then falls naturally into place as a means of protecting individuals facing that stigma and deprivation if we could, whereas that is basically the point of the latter. A complete specification of the civil-criminal distinction along these lines would start with identifying specific individual interests, or at least a procedure for arriving at agreement about what belongs on such a list. Plausible candidates for inclusion on this list would be the interest in free association, freedom of movement and occupation, and the interest in bodily integrity. The stigma of being treated in certain ways might also stand to be considered in this regard, particularly in light of the impact of a criminal conviction on employment, housing, and so forth.
Second, it would specify when setbacks to those interests are sufficiently serious that sideconstraints on the state's ability to create such setbacks to interests are appropriate. Third, it would contain an account of the rights appropriate to protect those interests, and a jurisprudence describing in detail how they apply in commonly arising situations.
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The procedure just sketched is naturally conceived of as a problem for ideal theory. But it is not necessary, for my purposes here, to provide such a theory. First, because basic interests such as freedom of association and movement will likely be on any resultant list, we can use those as our primary examples, leaving the precise contours of the list unspecified for now. Second, we can turn to state and federal constitutions, and perhaps entrenched common law rules, as 44 I am assuming that the interests in question are not fungible, and thus are not to be aggregated into an overall account of a person's welfare. This is an important assumption, but not one that I can defend here.
providing an account of the rights meant to protect the interests defined in the first step. Thus, although we might imagine different rights than the ones we in fact recognize, at least in the United States consensus has settled on such rights as the right against conviction unless the state proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the right against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, provision of counsel to the indigent, the prohibition on retroactive and overly vague laws, and the like as the rights that are reserved for defendants facing serious deprivation at the hands of the state.
Perhaps none of this is terribly controversial. What may be controversial is the claim that deciding whether or not a defendant is entitled to claim a given right at no point requires deciding whether or not he is being punished. On this view, what matters is whether he is facing, in the relevant sense, a sanction that jeopardizes a protected interest to the relevant degree. An affirmative answer is sufficient to entitle defendants to raise claims based on recognized criminal rights. This account draws on the sense that the criminal law is an object of particular concern because of the harshness of the sanctions it metes out. That much seems intuitive. But the account foregoes any mention of the retributive motive in punishment, and with it the idea that crimes must be acts which provide a reason in favor of inflicting harsh treatment. This part may seem less intuitive, even flatly wrong. After all, authors like Boonin and Husak have pointed out that eliminating the element of subjective motivation from our conception of punishment is to make the conception of punishment implausibly expansive, encompassing any serious harm the state imposes on people, foreseen or intended. But, they might say, it would be absurd to say that when the Massachusetts legislature authorizes a new runway at Logan airport, it is thereby "punishing" all the city residents living under the proposed runway's flight path-even though their quality of life is unquestionably diminished. Perhaps some of these residents would prefer a short prison sentence, probation, or community service to living under the flight path of a major metropolitan airport, but that does not make the two equivalent from the point of view of punishment. Why not? Because the Massachusetts legislature is not motivated to act by the prior bad acts of those citizens.
My strategy allows me to neatly and entirely sidestep this objection. After all, I do not propose to adopt a purpose-neutral conception of punishment. As I said, I concede that any recognizable conception of punishment must be one that incorporates reference to the punisher's reasons for acting, and thus one that adheres to principle R. What I deny is that punishment, thus understood, is relevant to whether a challenged statute is "criminal" or "civil," and so relevant to determining what rights defendants may claim. So I agree that the unfortunate residents under the city's new flight path are not punished, and I agree that they have none of the rights criminal defendants typically have, e.g., a right to be provided with subsidized legal counsel in fighting the proposal, or to demand that the city prove the necessity of thus situating the proposed runway beyond a reasonable doubt. But my acceptance of the latter proposition is not conditioned on my acceptance of the former. It is conditioned on the proposition that the harm to them is neither of the right kind nor sufficiently serious to justify granting them those kinds of rights.
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The proposal to decouple the legal category of the criminal law from the concept of punishment may come across as counter-intuitive. Certainly, it runs directly counter to the view that the function of the criminal law is to administer punishment: to determine who qualifies for
it, under what conditions, and what kind and how much are appropriate. These are, of course, functions that the criminal law must fulfill. But they are functions that any body of law that 45 One exception, as I have noted above, may be the Eighth Amendment, which, unlike the other rightsgranting provisions in the Constitution, specifically refers to "punishment." So it may be that, as a pure doctrinal matter, Eighth Amendment rights -such as they are -would be unaffected by my proposal.
imposes significant burdens on individuals has to fulfill as well. It is undoubtedly true that a great deal of official, state-sanctioned punishment is conducted under the auspices of the criminal law. But this is not a conceptual truth. It is rather because the forms of state-sanctioned punishment to which we are accustomed tend to be so severe that heightened protections are appropriate for individuals threatened with them. Conversely, less invasive state action might well still be punishment, but would not, for that reason alone, entitle those subject to it to the criminal law's protections.
One advantage of the view I have sketched is that it dovetails nicely with received wisdom in other areas of the criminal law. Most obviously, consider the standard explanation for the insistence on proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. According to this explanation, the consequences of a criminal conviction are typically so dire that we should prefer a bias in favor of false negatives over false positives-in terms of the famous Blackstone ratio, that we should prefer that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man be convicted. 46 Everything here turns on how badly things will go for the miserable convict, and nothing on the fact that, in sentencing him, the court will be intending to express condemnation for his prior wrongful act.
As with the standard of proof, the criminal protections I have been focusing on are similarly based on a concern with the likely consequences of a sanction on an individual. And since these consequences do not depend on the legislature's motivations, the class of defendants entitled to their protection should not depend on them either.
I have been focusing on cases in which it is not immediately apparent whether we should say the state is "punishing" people. However, the view I have sketched has broader implications.
Most notably, it suggests that the current allocation of criminal rights is almost certainly both over-and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive insofar as the outcome of nominally criminal proceedings can frequently be fairly minor sanctions, such as suspended sentences, probation, or fines. Stripping defendants in these sorts of cases of at least some of the panoply of criminal rights might make enforcement both cheaper and quicker. 47 Conversely, not all criminal process need be punitive, in the sense of motivated by retributive reasons. Perhaps some remedies are imposed for purely deterrent or incapacitative reasons, for instance strict liability regulatory offenses or "three-strikes" repeat offender laws. Moreover, there are ostensibly non-criminal proceedings in which a great deal may be at stake (immigration, occupational disbarment, severe stigmatic harms, and so forth); in these cases, extension of the protections of criminal procedure might well be appropriate. 48 It is entirely unclear why a person may be deported on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, when to sentence him to six months of probation requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 49 If it is unfair to retroactively increase a criminal fine for engaging in a prohibited activity, it is unclear why it should not also be unfair to retroactively authorize ruining a person's life by publicly branding him a sex offender. There is, on the account I have 47 One might object that removing, say, double jeopardy protection from defendants in low-level cases leaves those defendants vulnerable to continued prosecutorial harassment. The response is that in light of the relatively low stakes, this risk is no worse than it is in other, ostensibly civil, cases in which there are no double jeopardy protections but only the regular res judicata preclusion doctrines. Perhaps, if it were established that prosecutors-unlike civil plaintiffs and administrative agencies-are uniquely prone to harassing people, then double jeopardy protections would be appropriate even in low-level cases. But that would not be because the cases are criminal ones. It would be because the expected harm is greater.
In any case, I note that current law does not extend the full panoply of criminal protections to all "criminal" defendants. sketched, no need to insist that these remedies are all instances of punishment under principle R before we can conclude that defendants facing them be the object of heightened legal concern. It is sufficient that they constitute serious invasions of basic interests.
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I stress that it is not my aim here to propose an alternative doctrinal test for courts to adopt.
My proposal is, rather, an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about the civil-criminal distinction, particularly as that distinction bears on the allocation of distinctive criminal rights.
Nevertheless, it is worth situating this proposal in more standard doctrinal terms. The view I have sketched is perhaps best thought of as a proposal to rely on due process as the basis for the allocation of important substantive and procedural rights. Due process, on this view, would be engaged when certain types of basic interest-freedom of movement, severe stigma, and the like-are potentially subjected to serious state invasion.
It should be borne in mind that the functional significance of the civil-criminal distinction in American constitutional law is largely a result of judicial decision-making; it is not derived from some commandment somehow indelibly inscribed in the text of the Constitution. For instance, the ban on ex post facto legislation does not refer to either punishment or the criminal law; the right against double jeopardy is premised on the protection of "life or limb"; and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt was a common law requirement, later entrenched by due process. 51 As a matter of constitutional common law, these rights could straightforwardly be extended in a more functional, interest-protecting manner. essentially parallel rights, or the Court could formally, as a doctrinal matter, abandon its punishment-centered conception of the criminal law for a conception that considers a law to be "criminal" insofar as it threatens serious state invasion of basic interests. Either approach would have the effect of curtailing the significance of double effect reasoning by largely eliminating the significance of principle R for the allocation of rights; and either approach would achieve an allocation of rights that is driven by the protection of urgent interests rather than a formalistic conception of the criminal law. Stewart's claim that s.7 applies "whenever one of the three protected interests is engaged. Put another way, the principles of fundamental justice apply in criminal proceedings, not because they are criminal proceedings, but because the liberty interest is always engaged in criminal 52 Though, as I have noted, perhaps not entirely, given the explicit reference in the Eighth Amendment to "punishment." But, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "punishment" is a broader concept than that of criminal punishment, and the Eighth Amendment thus applies outside avowedly criminal contexts. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (affirming that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to in rem forfeiture proceedings, as the Eighth Amendment is intended to "limit the government's power to punish," and punishment embraces both civil and criminal actions. proceedings." 55 Moreover, the Court has interpreted s.7 to require the state to provide rights analogous to those familiar in traditionally "criminal" contexts.
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Finally, while this approach may seem quite alien to the United States Supreme Court's current fascination with legislative intent, this was not always so. During the Warren Court era, and for some time thereafter, the Supreme Court relied on due process rather than the civilcriminal distinction to allocate rights typically reserved for defendants in "criminal" cases. 57 See Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28, 33-34, 41, 49-50 (1967) (holding that the serious interests at stake grounded due process claims to advance notice, provision of counsel, the privilege against selfincrimination in state juvenile delinquency proceedings, regardless of the "civil" label applied to those proceedings); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1967) (holding that due process requires presence of the defendant, accompanied by counsel, an opportunity to be heard, to confront witnesses, cross-examine, and offer evidence in hearing under state sex offender act that authorized potential indeterminate life sentence, despite the fact that punishment under this act was not "designed not so much as retribution as it is to keep individuals from inflicting future harm"); and In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-368 (affirming Gault's rejection of "civil labels and good intentions," and holding that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
The Court has relied on due process to require heightened protections in non-criminal cases where the stakes are particularly high. See other due process challenges, the inquiry should be whether the governmental interests served by any given restriction outweigh the individual deprivations suffered." 58 The majority's focus on "official intent" was, Justice Marshall added, "unrealistic in the extreme." 59 Although this approach to the allocation of rights was gradually eclipsed by the Court's increasingly insistent focus on state intent-an approach that, I have argued, starts with a principle R-conforming conception of punishment and ends up by building double effect reasoning into constitutional law-this consensus is relatively recent, and perhaps not entirely stable.
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What does the approach I have sketched suggest for judicial deference to the legislature? If judicial deference is meant to be less than complete, then the approach I have sketched provides a principled basis for deciding, not whether the state may impose harsh sanctions (including stigmatic harms) on someone, but rather on how the state must do so. I have pointed out that a rule that makes the decision turn on the state's intent rests on a quite controversial position in moral theory. But, as I have further pointed out, if we reject the view that the state's intentions partially define the scope of what it is permissible for it to do, then we must find some other rule to use in deciding when deference is appropriate. The possibility considered here is that the rule for deciding when to defer be based on the impact of legislation on certain classes of protected individual interests, however that legislation happens to have been motivated. In fact, it is quite possible that a punishment-based conception of the criminal law is less deferential than the interest-based conception sketched here. For on the latter view, even a poorly motivated statute passes muster so long as the rights it allocates are commensurate with the burdens it imposes. In 58 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 at 564 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 59 Id. at 565. contrast, the intent-effects test entails that a poorly motivated but only modestly burdensome statute would-in theory-be subject to searching judicial review, resulting in the allocation of significant constitutional rights to defendants against express legislative will. 
3.
The foregoing discussion may seem rather abstract. I now turn to consider what it suggests for concrete cases, applying it to the cases with which I started, Doe and Hendricks.
Consider first the issue of retroactive application of sex offender registries, at issue in Smith v. Doe. Conceptually speaking, these are easy cases. The first step is to identify the interests allegedly jeopardized by registration as a sex offender. These, we may assume, tend to fall under three headings: an interest in employment, in housing, and against social stigmatization (especially an increased risk of being the target of vigilante violence and harassment). There may be other harmful consequences to sex offender registration as well, but suppose that these are the most damaging ones. The next question is to what degree registration sets back those interests. This is, naturally, an empirical question. 62 Let us assume that, at least for some non-trivial number of people, registration as a sex offender seriously harms core interests. Given these two 61 A parallel to a purpose-neutral conception can be found in the structure of rational basis review in equal protection doctrine. Actual state purpose is immaterial to rational basis review, since all the court is looking for is some legitimate good that the state may conceivably advance in a not too egregiously stupid or venal manner. It is not assessing the propriety of the actually effective motivation(s), assuming they are discernible. 65 Since extending the scope of the result element in homicide in this way means increasing the ex ante likelihood that any given act of stabbing will result in a legal homicide, it is not strictly true that the state court's elimination of the year-and-a-day rule had zero bearing on ex ante deliberation. O'Connor's argument thus seems to require something along the lines of a de minimis limitation: one only has a valid ex post facto claim if the change in the law effects a significant change in the expected costs of one's acts.
once we have conceded that registering as a sex offender on a database accessible via the Internet constitutes a serious infringement of basic interests, then those consequences, no less than imprisonment or fines, must be counted as "criminal penalties" of which the state is required to provide fair notice. After all, the prospect of lifetime registration as a sex offender could just as much be expected to enter into the practical deliberations of a person on the verge of committing a sex offense as a term of years in the state penitentiary.
The motivation for sex offender registries, unlike that of imprisonment or fines, may not be retributive, and hence, according to principle R, may not properly be considered punishment. But the question is not whether they are punishment. The question is to what degree they can be expected to harm those subject to them. So given the assumptions I have described, these become easy cases as far as application of the doctrine is concerned. The difficulties with cases like Doe are largely empirical, and consist in ascertaining just how severely this kind of registration is likely to harm people. If the answer turns out to be "not that much," then the conclusion should be that defendants in these cases have no protection under the ex post facto clause, given the de minimis character of the harm. And, once again, the conclusion would be in no way affected by, and at no point require any findings about, the legislature's motivation in extending the registration requirement retroactively.
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One may object here that the ex post facto clause does more than ensure fair notice. It also serves to restrict majoritarian abuse of unpopular individuals and groups, and thus requires reviewing courts to take a hard look at legislative purposes to ferret out "vindictive, malicious 66 In the case of the federal sex offender statute-SORNA-Congress did not specify whether it was to apply retroactively, instead leaving it to the attorney general (Alberto Gonzales, at the time) to decide. 69 For example: assassins frequently use silencers; therefore, we restrict the sale of silencers. Determining whether a given sale of a silencer conforms to those restrictions does not require investigating whether the purchaser intends to use it in an assassination. The transaction's conformity or non-conformity with the regulation is entirely independent of the purchaser's motivation.
being twice punished for the same offense. The state was, he argued, merely disguising the punishment under the guise of "civil commitment"; had they been forthright in acknowledging that the newly authorized commitment under the SVPA was expressly intended to enhance his punishment, then it would have been blocked by the federal constitution's ex post facto and double jeopardy bans.
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Certainly, Hendricks' interest in not being confined against his will is fundamental, and given the likelihood that the confinement will endure until he dies, the contemplated setback is serious, even extreme. This does not mean, however, that the ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibitions prevent Kansas from using the SVPA to commit Hendricks and others like him.
After all, the view is not that it is never permissible for the state to inflict a serious harm on an individual. The view is that the state may do so if it is consistent with, for instance, the right against retroactive legislation; and it is at least arguable that the SVPA is consistent with that right.
Consider the rationale for the ex post facto clause cited above, namely, that its role is to ensure that legislatures provide fair notice when they seek to impose stiff penalties, so that people are able to plan their actions accordingly. The question then becomes: does Kansas' SVPA, passed while Hendricks was incarcerated, deprive Hendricks of fair notice of the true consequences of the crimes for which he was convicted? The answer to this question is arguably "no." For the civil commitment that the SVPA authorizes is not simply an extension of the imprisonment he was already suffering. Rather, it requires Kansas to show beyond a reasonable 70 Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest as much: "if the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper function…On the record before us, the Kansas civil statute conforms to our precedents. If, however, civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring.) doubt that he is likely to recidivate, and that he therefore poses a serious ongoing threat to the community. In other words, the basis for the commitment is not Hendricks' prior offenses, but rather the expectation that he will reoffend in the future. Hendricks' status as a sexually violent predator is thus distinct from, though it may be supported by, his prior criminal conduct.
Moreover, although Kansas' definition of a sexually violent predator applies only to those who have been previously convicted of a violent sex crime, it is not the case that all those convicted of such crimes are, therefore, sexually violent predators. The state has to show more than a prior conviction before it is authorized to commit him.
Kansas' SVPA stands in sharp contrast to the civil commitment statute struck down in It is important to note the structure of the argument here. The claim I am defending is not that, once we set aside the inquiry into legislative purpose, the ex post facto clause then blocks every second serious incursion into a person's basic interests. It is that defendants should not be prevented from asserting claims under the ex post facto clause simply because they cannot show that the legislature acted with a punitive motive in passing whatever statute is at issue.
Constitutional criminal rights, such as the ex post facto ban, should apply regardless of legislative intent. But that does not mean that every assertion of what those rights entail is a correct assertion. In some cases-perhaps, I have suggested, in Hendricks itself-the right does not protect what the defendant claims it protects. In that case, even though the defendant is facing a serious setback to basic interests, the rights of criminal defendants are of no use to him.
4.
I conclude with two clarifications and a brief observation.
First: what is the logical relation between the diagnosis of the intent-effects test as relying on double effect reasoning, and the proposal to draw the civil-criminal distinction on the basis of protected interests rather than "punishment"? The logical form is this: I claim that someone who accepts the intent-effects test must, even if only implicitly, rely on some version of double effect reasoning. 73 It follows that someone who rejects double effect reasoning must also reject the illness" (or whatever) would in effect be arbitrary and capricious, and possibly grant authorities far too much discretion to commit whomsoever they please. 73 I am, of course, discussing an institutional rule, one that might be expected to have, at least in some circumstances, profound implications for many people. So I do not suggest that consistency alone will, in all cases, provide a decisive reason for (or against) adopting this or that rule. But it would be a serious misunderstanding to construe the argument of this paper as advocating for a specific alternative doctrinal test that courts could simply adopt as a replacement for the intent-effects test. Second, I have suggested that legal theorists wary of double effect reasoning have reason to decouple the concept of the criminal law from the concept of punishment by replacing the question "is X punishment?" with "does X amount to a serious invasion of basic interests?" as a criterion for adjudicating the boundaries of the "criminal" law. This is not meant to abolish the distinction between civil and criminal procedure, or between civil and criminal penalties; those categories remain important. 75 It is, rather, to suggest that insofar as there is anything importantly distinctive about "criminal" law, it is not in the content or subject matter of such laws-for instance, that they authorize state punishment for morally wrongful conduct-but in the provision of a distinctive regime of rights to an identifiable class of litigants.
Finally, a corollary to the argument I have presented is that the ongoing debates about criminalization may in an important sense be misconceived. Perhaps liberal polities should only criminalize conduct that results in certain kinds of harm, and perhaps they should only a rejection of double effect reasoning, and, if it is not, to suggest how one might go about thinking about the functional role that the doctrinal test fulfills. It is not meant to provide an all-things-considered argument for or against any doctrinal rule. 74 My thanks to Kim Ferzan and Amy Sepinwall for pushing me to clarify this point. 75 In contrast, unbundling the regime of rights allocated to "criminal" defendants arguably would abolish the civil-criminal distinction. Compare on this point Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, "Overcoming Procedural Boundaries." I express no view as to whether the bundle of rights allocated to criminal defendants should be disaggregated in the way Rosen-Zvi and Fisher suggest.
criminalize conduct when the harmful outcome can be fairly imputed to the person engaging in that kind of conduct. 76 But the reason this is a topic of particular interest to the criminal law is not because the criminal law is that branch of law designed to denounce, punish, and deter wrongful conduct. This may well be an accurate description of the substantive law of crimes, but it is likely to also be an accurate description of a maze of substantive "regulatory" offenses as well. Rather, the reason the appropriate scope of the criminal law is a distinct subject from the appropriate scope of government regulation generally is that the expected outcomes under "criminal" statutes are much worse than those under "civil" or "administrative" regulations.
From the point of view of a protected interests view of the criminal law, even if only some version of retributivism fully captures our sense of what it is to punish someone, it will not be the fact of its retributive character that makes punishment so hard to defend. It will be that punishment is an instance of state action that seriously invades basic individual interests.
In commenting on Hart's rejection of the doctrine of double effect, John Gardner has suggested that we "remind ourselves once again that punishment is intended by the punisher to inflict suffering on the punished, and that this element of intention can be expected to fortify any rule against its infliction, however that rule may otherwise be justified." 77 This shows, Gardner continues, "how little space there is to raise special doubts about the morality of the criminal justice system (as compared to the civil justice system, the taxation system, etc.) once the moral difference between intended effect and known side-effects is denied or suppressed." 78 have taken on the more modest project of showing that, despite appearances to the contrary, the inferences from criminal law to punishment, and from punishment to punitive purpose, are not forced on us. For although punishment may necessarily be governed by principle R, the criminal law need not be governed by punishment.
